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Abstract 
 Delay discounting captures the way in which people devalue rewards which are not 
immediately available as a function of their delay until receipt. Normatively, decision makers 
should be sensitive to inflation rates when evaluating delayed rewards because the value of a 
delayed outcome is eroded by inflation. We hypothesised that participants from countries 
with direct experience of high inflation would be particularly sensitive to inflation rates when 
making intertemporal choices; i.e. they may be more likely to take into consideration the 
effect of inflation on future rewards. This study compares intertemporal choices of 
participants from countries with dramatically different histories of inflation: Argentina and 
Britain. Participants completed a delay discounting task under two inflation rate conditions 
(2% and 20%, between subjects). We found that people discounted future rewards more 
steeply under the 20% inflation rate condition than under the 2% condition. Participants from 
Argentina, the country with much higher current and historical inflation rates, discounted 
future rewards more steeply in both inflation rate conditions than participants from the UK. 
However, Argentines were not more sensitive to inflation rates than British people. 
 
Key words: Delay discounting; Intertemporal choice; Argentina; UK; Inflation rate. 
JEL classification: D84, D90, E31. 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Lucía Macchia, Department of Psychology, City, University of London, Northampton 
Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK; lucia.macchia@city.ac.uk 
 
  2 
1. Introduction  
Other things being equal, people generally prefer to receive rewards sooner rather than later. 
As such, we are often willing to forgo a larger reward in the future for a smaller reward 
available immediately: for example, preferring to take £95 today over £100 in a year, or to 
smoke a cigarette now at the expense of long-term good health. The extent to which people 
prefer more immediate rewards is quantified in the study of delay discounting, which 
captures the way in which the value of a reward declines as the delay until its receipt 
increases.  
Delay discounting is a widespread phenomenon, seen across multiple reward types, 
including food (e.g., Rasmussen, Lawyer, & Reilly, 2010), health (e.g., Chapman & Elstein, 
1995), cigarettes (e.g., Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999), and illicit drugs (e.g., Madden, 
Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997), is seen for both gains and losses (e.g., Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2006), and is observed in both humans and non-human animals (Jimura, 
Myerson, Hilgard, Braver, & Green, 2009). Although delay discounting is relatively 
consistent within an individual and experimental procedure (Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000; 
Beck & Triplett, 2009), discounting is highly context-specific (see Lempert & Phelps, 2016, 
for a review), and varies substantially across individuals. 
1.2 Rationality and discounting 
High rates of delay discounting are often used as illustrations of human irrationality, adding 
to the many suboptimal heuristics and biases catalogued in decision making research. 
Discounting is often framed in terms of temporal myopia (Kirby & Maraković, 1995), self-
control failure (Madden et al., 1997) or impulsivity (Alessi & Petry, 2003), supported in part 
by the correlation between high delay discounting rates and other impulsive behaviours such 
as smoking, overeating, infidelity, and illicit drug use (see, e.g., Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & 
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Chater, 2009). At the extreme, any preference for a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later 
reward is treated as an impulsive choice. 
However, there are several reasons why choosing a smaller-sooner reward might be a 
normative, or at least non-impulsive, choice. Choosing to wait for a larger sum of money has 
an opportunity cost – there may be opportunities in the intervening time to spend a smaller-
sooner sum of money that has a high hedonic value per unit cost (see Read, 2004; also 
Zauberman & Lynch, 2005, for a similar argument). For example, an individual who chooses 
to wait for a sum of money rather than take it immediately would miss out on the opportunity 
in the intervening time to purchase a desired commodity if it was temporarily dramatically 
reduced in price, or take up a lucrative, time limited, investment opportunity. 
Similarly, future gains may be less certain than immediate gains, either in the hedonic 
value they have to an individual (at the extreme, an individual may not be alive to experience 
the delayed outcome at all; see Chabris, Laibson, & Schuldt, 2010, for discussion of mortality 
risk in discounting) or in the certainty of receipt – the money is less trusted to come through 
in the more distant future (e.g., Patak & Reynolds, 2007).  
Most concretely, there is the effect of inflation, which erodes the value of a fixed sum 
of money (see Urminsky & Zauberman, 2014). These effects can be dramatic: A fixed £1,000 
in 10 years’ time will be worth around one tenth as much in a high-inflation (30%) 
environment as in a low-inflation (3%) environment. 
Most discussions of delay discounting ignore the effects of inflation. There is some 
justification for this: Inflation cannot – at the relatively low rates seen in developed countries 
over recent decades – account for the comparatively high rates of discounting observed in the 
literature. Nor does discounting disappear completely when factors like inflation are 
controlled (see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002, for a review). Nonetheless, 
decision makers should normatively take inflation into account when making intertemporal 
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choices. As Frederick et al. (2002) noted, an individual’s experiences and expectations with 
regard to inflation should influence their intertemporal decisions.  
Furthermore, most of the discussion about inflation in intertemporal choice has 
assumed rates around those seen recently in developed countries. Many other countries have 
had much higher inflation rates: For example, Venezuela’s inflation rate in 2016 was around 
800%, and in periods of hyperinflation (such as Zimbabwe in 2008) countries have 
experienced periods with inflation rates of 100% per day. If a rational agent expected the 
latter inflation rate to continue, they should non-impulsively prefer to take Z$1 today rather 
than Z$300 million in a month’s time. 
Whether inflation actually does affect people’s discounting of rewards is a more open 
question. Ostaszewski, Green, and Myerson (1998) examined the effect of inflation on the 
subjective value of delayed and probabilistic rewards. They combined a typical discounting 
task, in which participants from Poland had to choose between an immediate and a delayed 
reward, which were available in two currencies that differed in their associations with 
inflation. The authors found that the subjective value of a delayed reward was greater when 
its amount was specified in a low inflation currency (US dollars) rather than in a high 
inflation currency (old Polish zlotys). Although it is impossible to control for all non-
inflationary differences in the perception of the currencies, the results suggest that previous 
experience of inflation might have increased discounting. 
In an experimental study, Kawashima (2006) created an artificial inflation rate across 
a series of trials by varying the purchasing power of a financial reward. Participants took part 
in three experimental conditions: inflationary, zero-inflationary, and deflationary. The author 
found that the delayed reward in the inflationary scenario was discounted more steeply than 
in the zero-inflationary and deflationary scenarios, suggesting a sensitivity to inflation. 
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Additionally, Takahashi, Masataka, Malaivijitnond, and Wongsiri, (2008) showed 
that among Thai participants, discounting of hypothetical money was steeper than that for 
hypothetical rice during a time of economic turbulence. They noted that generally food is 
discounted more than money, and that the opposite pattern of valuations they found might 
have been due to uncertainty about the future value of monetary outcomes. 
One way of examining the effects of experience with and expectation of inflation 
would be to compare discounting in countries where inflation is and has historically been 
high with that where inflation is and has been lower. A small number of cross-cultural studies 
of discounting have been conducted (e.g., Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Kim, Sung, & 
McClure, 2012), often showing differences in discount rates. Another approach has been to 
examine time preferences at the national level by analysing the temporal properties of the 
most frequent web searches (e.g., Noguchi, Stewart, Olivola, Moat, & Preis, 2014; Preis, 
Moat, Stanley, & Bishop, 2012). These studies revealed a relationship between time 
perspective and gross domestic product (GDP), but did not directly examine associations 
with inflation rates. One notable exception is a study by Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2016), who 
conducted a discounting task in 53 countries. The authors found substantial differences in 
time preferences across countries, but no association between either current or recent 
maximum inflation rates and discounting. 
2. The present study 
We hypothesise that experience with inflation affects intertemporal choices in two distinct 
ways. First, people in countries with historically higher rates of inflation may discount future 
rewards more. More subtly, it could be that experience with high levels of inflation makes 
people more sensitive to inflation rates when making intertemporal choices; that is, they take 
more account of the effects of inflation when valuing future rewards. In particular, one might 
expect individuals from countries with low levels of inflation to ignore or underweight the 
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long-term effects of inflation on purchasing power compared to those from countries with 
direct – costly – experience of the erosion of value from inflation. 
 We examined these two possibilities by comparing delay discounting choices among 
samples from Argentina and the UK in two different scenarios – one with an annual inflation 
rate of 2% and one with an annual inflation rate of 20%. Argentina’s annual inflation rate for 
2016 was 40.3% (IPC Congreso, 2017) while the UK’s annual inflation rate for the same year 
was 1.6% (Office for National Statistics, 2016). The selection of these two countries allowed 
us to test how people behave when they face a familiar inflation rate and a less familiar one. 
For instance, a 2% annual inflation rate is unfamiliar to Argentines, who have experienced 
inflation rates varying between 25% and 40% in the last 15 years. Similarly, an annual 
inflation rate of 20% is unfamiliar to UK residents as it exceeds by far the inflation rates that 
have been seen in the UK in the last 15 years, with a peak inflation rate of 4.2% in 2011.  
 We further examined how people’s knowledge of historical inflation rates in their home 
country and their ability to account for the impact of compound interest on the future values 
of goods are related to the discounting of future rewards. We argue that people with lower 
inflation literacy discount future rewards more steeply than people with higher literacy.  
3. Method  
3.1 Participants 
Participants from Argentina (n = 219) were recruited through OH Panel!, an Argentine 
crowdsourcing platform with a pool of participants who take part in surveys, tasks or 
experiments. Each Argentine participant was paid US$ 1.50 per complete task. Participants 
from the UK (n = 174) were recruited through Prolific Academic, a UK-based platform for 
participant recruitment, and were paid £1.07 per complete task. The task was offered to 
people who were at least 18 years old, enrolled in the participant pool of each platform, and 
who were nationals of the respective country. Those who consented to take part in the 
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experiment were presented with an attention check before the discounting task which was 
meant to verify that participants read all questions carefully. The attention check consisted of 
a question about favourite sports which included several answer categories. However, the 
question’s preamble instructed participants to click on the page title instead of selecting a 
response in order to proceed with the experiment. Participants who failed the attention check 
(i.e., selected an answer category instead of clicking on the title) were redirected to the end of 
the questionnaire before answering any questions. In addition, we included several recall 
questions at the end of the task to test whether participants remembered the description of the 
hypothetical country and therefore probably took it into account while completing the 
discounting task. Most importantly, participants were asked about the country’s inflation rate, 
its population and which situation best described the country (high employment and low 
corruption, among other options). Of the 492 participants who completed the survey, 99 
answered at least one of these questions incorrectly and were excluded from the final sample 
(Argentina: 60 and UK: 39). However, at the end of the study, we re-ran our analysis with the 
full sample (including these 99 participants) and found the same substantive results. 
Unsurprisingly, effects were weaker with the full sample and the coefficient for the inflation 
rate condition was no longer significant (the complete data set is archived on the Open 
Science Framework, https://osf.io/6j8n9/).  
The final sample consists of 393 participants, 219 from Argentina and 174 from the 
UK. Of these 393 participants, 146 are male and 247 are female (Argentine sample: 38% 
male; UK sample: 36% male) with ages ranging from 18 to 80 (Argentina Mean = 45.90, SD 
= 12.81; UK Mean = 42.20, SD = 13.58).  
3.2 Design and materials 
Participants were presented with a scenario in which they had inherited an investment in an 
unnamed foreign country and had to choose whether to cash in the investment immediately or 
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wait until they could obtain more money. In order to provide some context, several facts 
about the hypothetical country were shown: Filler information about the population, levels of 
employment and corruption, and our main variable of interest, the inflation rate, along with a 
description of whether it was considered low or high. While the irrelevant facts (population, 
employment, etc.) were the same in both conditions, the inflation rate was manipulated: In 
one between-subjects condition the rate was low (2%) and in the other it was high (20%). 
Participants from both Argentina and the UK were randomly assigned to one of the inflation 
conditions (Argentina: n=120 Low, n=99 High; UK: n=94 Low, n=80 High). A fictitious 
currency was used, to avoid participants’ use of existing inflationary knowledge, and a point 
exchange rate to US dollars was given to allow evaluation of magnitude. Perceptions of 
uncertainty about the receipt of the money in the future were reduced by informing 
participants that the investment was safe because it was backed by the government of the 
country along with several international agreements. Participants were then invited to make a 
series of binary choices between hypothetical amounts of money in a discounting task, one 
available immediately and the other one after a delay of varying length, to estimate the 
immediate value of a delayed amount of 10,000 units of a hypothetical currency across four 
delays: 1 month, 6 months, 1 year and 5 years.  
Two measures of inflation literacy were constructed based on seven separate 
questions. The variable ‘Knowledge of compound interest’ is the sum of correct answers to 
four different questions about the calculation of goods’ prices in an inflationary context. A 
value of one was assigned to each question if participants answered it correctly, treating 
rounding errors as correct, and zero otherwise. The variable ‘Knowledge of previous inflation 
rates’ is the sum of correct answers to three questions. As the correct answers for these 
questions differed by country and the magnitude of the correct answers was substantially 
different, a direct comparison of scores was not meaningful. Therefore, we calculated the 
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distance between the correct answer and each participant’s response and the absolute value of 
the whole measure per country. We ranked scores within each country and centred the mean 
of each country distribution to zero to counterbalance the effect of sample differences. The 
exact information participants read and the seven questions used to construct these two 
measures can be found in the Supplementary Materials (section S1). 
Finally, participants were asked additional questions including their gender, age, 
highest level of education, nationality, perception about their income and the recall questions 
previously described. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions are 
shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of variables by country 
  Argentina UK    
Variable Mean (SD)  Min Max Mean (SD) 
 
Min Max Definition 
Male 0.38 
(0.49) 
0 1 0.36 
(0.48) 
0 1 Gender dummy (1 = male) 
Age 45.90 
(12.81) 
19 80 42.20 
(13.58) 
18 80 Age of respondent at time of survey in 
years.  
Level of Education 3.37 
(1.13) 
1 5 3.28 
(1.40) 
1 5 Level of education 1 to 5 (1= Secondary 
school/some high school; 2= Sixth 
form/completed high school; 3= 
Incomplete university; 4= Completed 
university; 5= Postgraduate qualification). 
Income ladder 5.55 
(1.31) 
2 9 5.15 
(1.59) 
1 10 Imagine a staircase with 10 steps where the 
poorest people in your country are on the 
first step and the richest on the tenth step. 
Where would you put yourself on this 
staircase? 
Knowledge of compound 
interest 
1.79 
(1.33) 
0 4 2.05 
(1.07) 
0 4 Level of knowledge of calculation of prices 
of goods in an inflationary situation. A 
higher value indicates better knowledge. 
(Possible range 0-4). 
Knowledge of previous 
inflation rates 
0 
(20.61) 
-48.57 39.43 0 
(13.3) 
-22.94 40.06 Level of knowledge of previous inflation 
rates. A higher number denotes better 
knowledge. 
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3.3 Procedure 
The study was coded in Adobe Flash (see Reimers & Stewart, 2015) and run online. Two 
versions of the experiment were used: The Argentine version was in Spanish and the UK 
version in English, with the translation of the English version into Spanish conducted by the 
first author, a native Argentinian Spanish speaker. The Spanish version was also back-
translated into English by a bilingual speaker; we did not find significant differences between 
the translations. The experiments were identical in all other respects. Participants received an 
email from the panel to which they were subscribed and clicked a link to a URL on the 
researchers’ servers where they completed the study. For the delay discounting task, we 
implemented a staircase procedure (e.g., Du et al., 2002): the immediate amount for 
subsequent choices was adjusted based on earlier choices. The delayed reward was shown on 
the right side of the screen and the smaller, immediate reward on the left side. For the first 
binary choice at a given delay, participants chose between a delayed 10,000 units (the larger-
later option) or an immediate 5,000 units (the smaller-sooner option), i.e., half of the delayed 
reward. To obtain the present subjective value of the delayed reward the amounts shown 
were adjusted in each iteration as follows: if a participant chose the larger-later option in the 
first stage, the smaller-sooner reward was increased by half of the difference between the 
initial immediate and delayed reward amounts; conversely if the smaller-sooner option was 
chosen, the smaller sooner value decreased the same way on the next trial. This procedure, 
with six iterations, converged on the immediate value of the larger-later outcome. This 
subjective value, representing the best estimate of the immediate value of the delayed 
amount, was recorded for each of the four delays, resulting in four measures per participant.   
3.4 Analytical methods  
The procedure used to assess differences in individual discounting rates is the calculation of 
the area under the discounting function (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The 
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advantage of this method is that it is theoretically neutral because the area under the curve 
(AUC) is calculated from the observed data points (the empirical discounting function) 
instead of a theoretical discounting function fitted to the data. The area under the curve can 
vary between 0 (steepest discounting) and 1 (no discounting); therefore, a smaller AUC 
implies steeper discounting.  
We analysed differences in individuals’ discounting behaviour using ordinary least 
squares regressions (OLS) with the AUC as the dependent variable and indicator variables 
for the country and inflation condition as predictors. Our model also accounts for possible 
differences in sample composition between the two countries by including socio-
demographic variables that have in the past been associated with discount rates, namely, age, 
gender, education and perception of income, measured by the income ladder question, (e.g., 
Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Reimers et al., 2009). 
4. Results 
One potential problem with discounting tasks is that the resulting data may be non-
systematic. Although the analysis that follows does not exclude any non-systematic 
responses, a similar analysis that does gives almost identical results. Researchers have 
proposed various criteria by which such data can be identified and subsequently excluded 
from the analysis, for instance, based on the variance accounted for by the model (e.g., 
Myerson & Green, 1995; Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006) or other criteria (e.g., Johnson 
& Bickel, 2008). To check that our results are not biased due to non-systematic data, we 
checked whether responses met any of the following two exclusion criteria: 1. Starting from 
the second delay, the subjective value shows an increase of more than 20% of the delayed 
reward (i.e., 2000) in relation to the preceding value (first exclusion criterion suggested by 
Johnson and Bickel, 2008), and 2. The subjective value of the last delay (i.e., 5 years) is 
greater than the subjective value of the first delay (i.e., 1 month). Discounting choices that 
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followed either one or both of these criteria were excluded from the data set and the analysis 
was re-run. 23 cases were deleted across both samples, most of them due to the second 
criterion and because the participants showed no sensitivity to delay, namely, no discounting. 
The regression models based on the reduced sample can be found in the Supplementary 
Materials section (section S2). Our results are therefore not driven by potentially non-
systematic choices. 
4.1 The shape of the discounting function  
Much of the literature on delay discounting in financial decisions has examined the nature of 
the relationship between a reward’s delay and its perceived value. Normatively, people might 
be expected to show exponential discounting. However, when participants evaluate or choose 
between options at varying delays, their choices, both at the individual and aggregate level, 
tend to be better approximated by a hyperbolic function linking delay and value (e.g., Kirby 
& Herrnstein, 1995; Myerson & Green, 1995). Similarly, in the present analysis, a hyperbolic 
model fits the data better than an exponential model; both at the group level and in a large 
number of participants. (Equations for each type of discounting as well as the analysis of data 
fit can be found in the Supplementary Materials, section S3).  
4.2 Discounting results 
We employed a process which bisects the possible range of the immediate subjective value of 
a given delayed reward in each iteration. This process yields the smallest immediate value 
that is preferred over the delayed outcome and the largest immediate value that is rejected for 
each participant-delay-amount combination. The indifference point is – as is standard with 
these procedures – taken as the mean of these two values. For example, if a participant 
chooses “£200 in a month” over “£50 now”, but prefers “£60 now” over “£200 in a month”, 
their indifference point for that delayed outcome is £55. The AUC was then calculated for 
each participant using these points. The values in Figures 1 and 2 are the means across all 
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participants of these individual indifference points. The curves represent the best fit of the 
data to the hyperbolic function. Thus, these calculations are relatively independent of theory. 
 More specifically, Figures 1 and 2 show how participants from Argentina and the UK 
discount future rewards in the two inflation rate conditions. Figure 1 shows the median 
subjective values of the delayed reward for each delay for Argentine (circles) and British 
(triangles) participants in the low inflation condition (2%). Figure 2 shows the same type of 
information for the high inflation condition (20%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  15 
Figure 1: Median subjective values of the reward for each country as a function of delay in 
the low inflation rate condition (2%). 
 
 
The subjective value of the reward is presented as a proportion of its nominal 
amount. Curves represent the best fit to the hyperbolic function V=A/(1 + kD) where V is 
the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the absolute value of the delayed reward, 
D denotes the delay until receipt of the delayed reward, and k is the discounting 
parameter. 
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Figure 2: Median subjective values of the reward for each country as a function of delay in 
the high inflation rate condition (20%). 
 
We tested our hypotheses employing ordinary least squares regressions (Table 2). 
This approach allowed us to account for potential sample differences by including socio-
demographic variables as predictors in the regression. We ran two different regression 
models which use the Area Under the Curve as the dependent variable. As described above, 
this method employs people’s actual responses and avoids fitting a mathematical function to 
the data. In the first model, we tested the relationship between the Area Under the Curve and 
participants’ country of residence, the inflation rate condition, the interaction between these 
two variables, gender, age, income ladder and level of education. The second regression 
model adds to the first model two measures of inflation literacy (Table 2, column 2). The first 
The subjective value of the reward is presented as a proportion of its nominal 
amount. Curves represent the best fit to the hyperbolic function V=A/(1 + kD) where V is 
the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the absolute value of the delayed reward, 
D denotes the delay until receipt of the delayed reward, and k is the discounting 
parameter. 
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model (Table 2, column 1) suggests that Argentine participants discount future rewards more 
steeply than participants from the UK under both inflation rate conditions, as reflected in the 
significant, positive coefficient for the UK country indicator variable (b=0.110, p=.002). In 
addition, participants are, on average, sensitive to inflation rates: they discount future rewards 
more steeply under the 20% than under the 2% inflation rate condition, as shown by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the 2%-inflation rate indicator variable (b=0.065, 
p=.04). The model does not show significant associations between the AUC and any of the 
socio-demographic control variables. We further do not find evidence that sensitivity to 
inflation rates varies by country; the interaction term between country of residence and 
inflation rate condition is not significant in our model (b=-0.035, p=.46). This finding 
suggests that people who have experienced high inflation are not more sensitive to inflation 
rates than those without such experience. We do not find any significant associations between 
the socio-demographic variables and the AUC. However, in the standard model (Table 2, 
model 1), the associations regarding age, education and income were all in the direction seen 
in previous research (i.e., older, richer, better educated people had higher AUC), but did not 
reach statistical significance. It is possible that these effects are small and would have been 
significant in a larger sample.   
We included two measures of inflation literacy in a second model in order to assess 
whether responses in the discounting task were affected by the participant’s knowledge of 
compound interest and historic inflation rates in their home country (Table 2, column 2). As 
before, the results indicate that British participants show shallower discounting than 
Argentine participants, even after controlling for inflation literacy (b=0.104, p=0.003).  
Participants in general discount more under the 20% inflation condition than under the 2%, 
showing sensitivity to the inflation rate (b=0.065, p=.04). Participants’ knowledge of 
compound interest is significantly positively associated with the Area Under the Curve 
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(b=0.021, p=.04), which suggests that people with better knowledge discount future rewards 
less steeply than people with poorer knowledge. In contrast, knowledge of previous inflation 
rates in one’s home country is significantly negatively associated with the AUC (b=-0.002, 
p=.02). However, the magnitude of this effect is quite small as the coefficient is close to zero. 
The coefficient for the country of residence indicator variable remains significant after 
adding measures of inflation literacy to the model, suggesting that differences in discounting 
behaviour across countries may be more related to country differences than to inflation 
literacy. 
Table 2: Ordinary least squares regressions for the Area Under the Curve (AUC)  
 Dependent variable: Area Under the Curve 
 (1) (2) 
Country of residence – UK  
(Ref.: Argentina) 
    0.110
** 
(0.035)
 
   0.104
** 
(0.035) 
Inflation rate condition - 2% 
(Ref.: 20%) 
  0.065
* 
(0.032) 
 0.065
* 
(0.031) 
Gender - Male  0.048
 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
Age 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Level of education 0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Income ladder 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.0002 
(0.008) 
Country of residence - UK*Inflation 
rate condition - 2% 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
-0.038 
(0.047) 
Knowledge of compound interest -   0.021
* 
(0.010) 
Knowledge of previous inflation rates - -0.002
* 
(0.001) 
Constant    0.459
*** 
(0.069) 
   0.462
*** 
(0.071) 
Observations 393 393 
R
2
 0.058 0.089 
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Adjusted R
2
 0.041 0.067 
Residual Std. Error 0.235 (df = 385) 0.231 (df = 383) 
F Statistic 3.403
***
 (df = 7; 385) 4.151
***
 (df = 9; 383) 
Note: 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
 
Additionally, we investigated whether discounting differs from the inflation rate 
presented in the experiment. Employing a t-test, we compared the AUC for both countries in 
both inflation rate conditions with the AUC which corresponds to the inflation rates 
presented in the experiment, 20% and 2%. We found that in the low inflation condition 
AUCs of both countries are significantly smaller (i.e., higher discounting) than the AUCs 
corresponding to the treatment inflation rate of 2%, [tArg(119) = 15, p < .001; tUK(93) = 11, p 
< .001]. In the high inflation condition, both AUCs are numerically smaller than the AUC 
corresponding to the treatment inflation rate of 20%, although this difference is only 
significant for Argentine participants [tArg(98) = 4.35, p<.001; tUK(79) = 0.21, p=.83].  
4.3 Additional analyses 
We performed additional analyses in order to confirm the robustness of the results (the 
regression tables can be found in the Supplementary Materials section). We repeated the 
main regression analysis including interaction terms between treatment effects and each of 
the socio-demographic variables. The only additional significant coefficients can be found for 
the interaction between age and both country of residence (Table S4.1, model 2) and inflation 
rate condition (Table S4.2, model 2). These results suggest that the AUC increases more with 
age in the UK than in Argentina (i.e., older people discount less). However, the main effect 
of age is not significant, suggesting that there is actually no association between age and 
AUC in Argentina, the reference category. The significant coefficient for the interaction term 
between inflation rate condition and age (Table S4.2, model 2) implies a positive association 
between AUC and age in the 2% condition (i.e. older people discount less), but this is not the 
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case in the 20% condition as the coefficient for age is not significant. These results confirm 
previously found age effects (e.g., Reimers, et al, 2009) and suggest that our UK data are 
sensible. In addition, the results indicate that older people in Argentina do not show a lower 
discounting rate as is usually found in their age group. This may be due to their likely earlier 
experience with hyperinflation. 
 In addition, we explored the role of people’s experience with inflation assuming that 
older people are more likely to have more experience with high inflation than younger 
people. We created two groups for each country based on each participant’s age during 
periods of higher inflation in their country (assuming that participants had to be at least 16 
years old to be personally significantly affected during periods of high inflation). For 
Argentina, the high inflation group contains observations for people who were at least 16 
years old in 1989, the year of hyperinflation. They were thus at least 43 years old in 2016, the 
year of data collection. For the UK, the high inflation group contains observations for people 
who were at least 16 years old in 1975, the year with the highest recent inflation rate in the 
UK. These participants were at least 57 years old in 2016. We repeated the main regression 
analysis with interaction terms between these newly created age groups (proxies for 
experience with high inflation) and the inflation rate condition. We did not find a significant 
coefficient for this interaction in any of the two country samples (Table S5). This finding 
confirms that people with experience with higher inflation are not necessarily more sensitive 
to inflation rates than people without such experience. 
5. Discussion  
The present study used a hypothetical delay discounting procedure to examine the effect of 
inflation rate on discounting. Participants completed –between subjects – sets of binary 
discounting choices in scenarios with two annual inflation rates – 2% and 20%. We examined 
the effect of this manipulation in participants from Argentina (who most likely had direct 
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experience of high inflation rates as they live in a high inflationary context) and the UK (who 
most likely did not as they live in a low inflationary context).  
We formulated three predictions about the effect of experience with inflation on 
individual discount rates. The first was that discount rates would be higher in scenarios with 
high inflation than in low inflation scenarios. This is what we found, and this result is in line 
with Kawashima’s (2006) findings suggesting that high inflation is associated with steeper 
discounting.  
The second prediction was that people who had the experience of high inflation 
would show higher discount rates. As such, we predicted that our Argentine sample would 
show higher rates of discounting than our UK sample. This was what we found. This result is 
congruent with Ostaszewski, et al.’s (1998) finding that delay discounting was higher in a 
currency with a history of high inflation than a currency with a history of low inflation. It 
also fits with findings from Takahashi, et al. (2008), who found that in a turbulent economic 
scenario food is, in general, discounted more than money. The reason for this reversal might 
have been the uncertainty about the future value of monetary outcomes. 
As with other cross-cultural studies (e.g., Du, et al., 2002; Wang, et al., 2016), this 
conclusion can only be tentative. We attempted to recruit participants with a similar 
demographic distribution in the UK and Argentine samples, and to include demographics in 
our analyses. That said, although we accounted for a number of socio-demographic variables 
and participants’ inflation literacy, unobserved differences between the samples from the two 
countries may remain. Future studies should include additional measures to better understand 
sample differences which may be related to individual sensitivity to inflation rates. For 
instance, the home country’s political and economic stability, individual preferences for 
gambling or tolerance for risk, more detailed measures of education (type and area of study; 
e.g., finance versus non-finance-related studies), as well as differences in relative and 
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absolute income. However, such additional measures would require careful interpretation. 
For example, we decided to include a relative rather than an absolute measure of income in 
our study because although absolute income is almost certainly lower among our Argentine 
participants compared to our British participants, costs of living are also generally lower in 
Argentina.  
The third prediction was that people with experience of high inflation would have a 
better grasp of the way in which high inflation rates erode the value of future rewards and 
would show a greater sensitivity to the inflation rate in the scenarios we used. We, therefore, 
predicted that the difference in discount rates for 2% and 20% inflation rate scenarios would 
be greater for Argentine participants than for UK participants. We did not find this: 
participants from the two countries showed similar – relatively weak – sensitivity to inflation 
rates in our scenarios.  
5.1 Implications  
Overall, our findings suggest that people are sensitive to inflation rate in discounting tasks, 
but that they are not sensitive enough: Objectively, a sum of money available in five years 
would be able to buy twice as much in a 2% inflation condition than in a 20% condition, yet 
participants valued 5-year-delayed rewards only around 1.5 times as much in the 2% 
condition than the 20% condition (see Figures 1 & 2). Further, we found that living in a 
country with current and historic high rates of inflation did not make people react more 
strongly to higher inflation rates – if anything, experience with high inflation rates led to 
higher overall discounting rather than increased sensitivity to inflation in a discounting 
scenario. Due to their experience with higher inflation rates, participants from Argentina may 
be more used to dealing with inflation. For instance, a 20% annual inflation rate may be 
familiar to Argentine people and lead to less sensitivity to changes in inflation rates. Of 
course, the higher overall discounting need not be irrational. Although our study informed 
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participants about the current inflation rate, it did not (and, of course, could not) state what 
the inflation rate in the future would be. As such, participants from Argentina might have 
made predictions that inflation would be higher over coming years than those from the UK, 
and so discount future outcome accordingly.  
We found that people with better ability to calculate compound interest discount 
future rewards less steeply than people with less ability. This was a counterintuitive finding. 
We predicted that those with better ability would be more able to overcome people’s natural 
propensity to underestimate the effects of compounding, and so would see the true impact of 
inflation on future value. As such, we predicted that they would show higher discounting, 
particularly in the high-inflation scenario. However, it can be related to the association 
between cognitive ability and discounting behaviour: Frederick (2005) found that people who 
scored higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test (i.e., people who tend to engage in reflective, 
deliberative and conscious thinking) devalue or discount future rewards less than people who 
obtained a lower score. Similarly, IQ and cognitive skills are associated with lower rates of 
discounting (see, e.g., Burks, Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; de Wit, Flory, Acheson, 
McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007). Presumably, there is a rate of inflation at which more 
numerate participants would discount more highly than less numerate participants.  
We also included a question which tested people’s knowledge and memory of 
previous inflation rates in their home country. In this case, although the effect is modest, 
people with better knowledge discount future rewards more steeply than people with poorer 
knowledge. Previous research (e.g., Senecal, Wang, Thompson, & Kable, 2012) has 
suggested that high individual’s discount rates can be due to lack of knowledge of the 
normative strategy on how to deal with interest rates and future rewards.   
Finally, the discounting behaviour we observe among our participants reflects that of 
participants in typical discounting studies: the subjective values decrease as delay increases 
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(Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989; Thaler, 1981) and furthermore, the rate of discounting 
decreases with increasing delay, as shown by a better fit to a hyperbolic versus and 
exponential function. In the high-inflation condition, discounting was approximately that 
normatively predicted from compensating for inflation. However, in the low-inflation 
condition, discounting was much higher than normatively predicted from inflation. This 
finding is in line with a Frederick et al.’s (2002) study which suggests that individual’s 
discount rates are significantly higher that market interest rates.  
5.2 Limitations and future work 
One potential limitation of this study was that participants were not incentivised to report true 
preferences, using hypothetical rewards. Although this is the approach taken in other 
inflation-related research (e.g., Ostaszewski et al., 1998; Takahashi et al., 2007), it is possible 
that participants would have responded differently with real outcomes. 
We do not think that this had a substantial effect on our results. There are few 
differences in delay discounting or real and hypothetical rewards (e.g., Lagorio & Madden, 
2005; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003), and participants showed patterns of 
discounting – such as the hyperbolic shape of the discounting function, and overall rate of 
discounting – that were consistent with both incentivised and non-incentivised previous 
research. It is, of course, hard to use real outcomes in discounting choice designs around 
inflation without complicating the task by using artificial monetary exchange rates. However, 
it might be possible to use a multi-round procedure where participants’ future gains lose 
value across rounds (see Kawashima, 2006) to simulate inflation and explore differences in 
these scenarios. This would give a different type of sensitivity to inflation, but one that was 
rather distant from the delay discounting literature.  
Another limitation is that we cannot assess to what extent participants took into 
account the potential effect of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which is related to an 
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uncovered risk in changes in foreign exchange rates. A higher inflation rate may suggest to 
participants a higher loss on the exchange rate as the rewards in our study are expressed in a 
foreign currency. There is a risk in waiting to cash in rewards because of possible changes in 
currency exchange rates, even more so in the presence of inflation. However, although we 
cannot know for certain whether participants took the UIP into consideration, we believe that 
only participants with a deep knowledge of finance or economics were likely to do so. 
Studies that use payoffs in the currency of participants’ home country do not encounter this 
potential limitation (e.g., Wang et al., 2016). However, we believe that a hypothetical 
currency was more appropriate for our scenarios because participants are likely to have 
certain expectations and biases with regards to inflation for specific currencies. 
We also note that the scenarios we used underplayed the salience of inflationary 
information. We deliberately did not emphasise the inflation rate, but included it along with 
other details about the scenario as we did not want the manipulation to be transparent to 
participants. This may in part explain why participants’ sensitivity to inflation rate was 
relatively weak. It is possible that when participants are more explicitly cued to take into 
account inflation, larger effects of inflation and other macroeconomic country characteristics 
might emerge. However, our results suggest that participants from Argentina do not 
automatically attend to and use inflation information more than those from the UK. 
6. Conclusion 
One way in which high rates of discounting are explained normatively is that people 
compensate for anticipated high rates of future inflation, based on their previous experience.  
We noted that outside the recent experiences of developed countries, inflation rates are high 
enough to justify very high rates of discounting. However, our findings suggest that 
participants are normatively suboptimal: They take into account inflation, but not enough, 
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and experience with high inflation rates does not lead to improved calibration to inflation 
rates in discounting tasks.  
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Supplementary Materials 
S1. Instructions for the experiment 
Screen 1: Introduction to the study 
 
Screen 2: Context of the experiment 
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Screen 3: First screen with the different amounts of money 
 
 
Creation of inflation literacy measures  
The measure ‘Level of knowledge of previous inflation rates’ is composed of three questions:  
1) To the best of your knowledge, what was the highest annual rate of inflation that 
your country experienced during the last 30 years?  
Correct answer Argentina: 3079% 
Correct answer UK: 7.53% 
2) To the best of your knowledge, what was the lowest annual rate of inflation that 
your country experienced during the last 30 years?  
Correct answer Argentina: -1.17 % 
Correct answer UK: 0.05 % 
3) To the best of your knowledge, what was the rate of inflation that your country 
experienced over the past year?  
Correct answer Argentina: 40.3% 
Correct answer UK: 1.6% 
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As the correct answers for these questions differed by country and their ranges were 
substantially different, a direct comparison of scores was not meaningful. Therefore, we 
calculated the distance between the correct answer and each participant’s response and the 
absolute value of the whole measure per country. We ranked scores within each country and 
centred the mean of each country distribution to zero to counterbalance the effect of sample 
differences. The correct answers to these questions were obtained from the World Bank 
World Development indicators (2017) and from Inflation.eu (2017). 
The measure ‘Level of knowledge of calculation of impact of compound interest is 
composed of four questions: 
1) If inflation is 10% a year, and a product currently costs US$1,000, how much will 
it cost in one year’s time? 
Correct answer: US$ 1100 
2) If inflation is 50% a year, and a product currently costs US$1,000, how much will 
it cost in two year’s time? 
Correct answer: US$ 2250 
3) If inflation is 3% a year, and a product currently costs US$1,000, how much will it 
cost in five year’s time? 
Correct answer: US$ 1159 
4) If inflation is 100% a year, and a product currently costs US$1,000, how much will 
it cost in five year’s time? 
Correct answer: US$32,000 
For each question, the correct answer was assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. The 
final measure is the sum of all for questions (range 0-4). 
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S2. Additional regressions 
Table A2.1: OLS results applying exclusion criteria.  
 
Dependent variable: Area Under the Curve 
 
(1) (2) 
Country of residence – UK 
(Ref.: Argentina) 
   0.133
*** 
(0.035) 
    0.128
*** 
(0.035) 
Inflation rate condition - 2% 
(Ref.: 20%) 
   0.085
** 
(0.032) 
   0.085
** 
(0.032) 
Gender - Male 
0.042
 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.026) 
Age 
0.002
 
(0.001) 
0.002
 
(0.001) 
Level of education  
0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
Income ladder 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Country of residence - UK*Inflation 
rate condition - 2% 
-0.051 
(0.048) 
-0.056 
(0.047) 
Knowledge of compound interest - 
   0.026
* 
(0.010) 
Knowledge of previous inflation rates - 
   -0.002
** 
(0.001) 
Constant 
    0.389
*** 
(0.069) 
    0.394
*** 
(0.070) 
Observations 370 370 
R
2
 0.081 0.128 
Adjusted R
2
 0.064 0.106 
Residual Std. Error 0.226 (df = 362) 0.221 (df = 360) 
F Statistic 4.575
***
 (df = 7; 362) 5.858
***
 (df = 9; 360) 
    Note: 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001 
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S3. Shape of the discounting function – additional comments  
Exponential discounting is represented by the following equation: 
V = Ae
-kD                                                                                   
(Eq. 1) 
where V is the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the absolute value of the delayed 
reward, and D is the delay until receipt of the delayed reward. Exponential discounting is 
constant, leads to time-consistent decision making, and accounts for compounding of interest 
and the eroding effects of inflation over time.  
Hyperbolic discounting is represented by the following equation: 
V = A/(1+kD)                                                     (Eq. 2) 
where V is the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the absolute value of the delayed 
reward, and D is the delay until receipt of the delayed reward. The parameter k represents the 
discount factor: a higher k indicates steeper discounting when the data are fitted to this 
function. In hyperbolic models of discounting, the discount rate is much higher for the 
immediate future than for the distant future. Thus, the value of a reward initially declines 
sharply with delay; however, an additional delay has relatively little effect on value, which 
can lead to preference reversals as the time of the smaller-sooner reward approaches (Green, 
Fry & Myerson, 1994; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Loewenstein, 1988; Myerson & Green, 
1995).  
In order to determine which delay discounting model (exponential vs. hyperbolic) was 
a better fit to our data overall, we calculated fit statistics to the group median data for the 
discounting functions (Eqs. 1 and 2) as well as fits to individual data. The quality of a 
discounting model is not only determined by its ability to describe the aggregate behaviour of 
a group but also by its accuracy to describe the behaviour of the individuals in that group (see 
Green & Myerson, 2004). Table S3.1 shows the R2 values for the discounting functions fitted 
to the group median data by country and inflation rate condition. 
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Table S3.1: Model fitting results  
 
 20% condition 2% condition 
 Argentina UK Argentina UK 
Exponential R
2
 .998 .998 .953 .945 
Hyperbolic R
2
 .997 .998 .992 .987 
 
At the aggregate level, the hyperbolic model (Eq. 2) accounted for a higher proportion 
of the variance than the exponential model (Eq. 1) in both countries in the low inflation rate 
condition. In the high inflation rate condition, the R
2
 values were very similar in both 
countries for both models. However, at the individual level, the R
2 
for the hyperbolic model 
(Eq. 2) was higher than that of the exponential model (Eq. 1) in 278 (73 %) of the 381 
participants who exhibited some kind of discounting
1
, and the difference between these 
models was significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p < .001). 
 
S4. Interactions between treatment effects and participant characteristics 
To test whether differences between samples and countries (participant characteristics) 
influence the results we repeated the main analysis including interactions between the 
treatment effects (country of residence and inflation rate condition) and socio-demographic 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Of the total sample of 393 participants, 8 exhibited no discounting, 1 total discounting and 3 constant 
discounting across the four delays.  
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Table S4.1: Main analysis with interactions between country of residence and participant 
characteristics. 
 
Dependent variable: Area Under the Curve 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country of residence – UK  
(Ref.: Argentina) 
0.121
** 
(0.039) 
-0.059 
(0.089) 
0.124 
(0.072) 
0.101 
(0.097) 
Inflation rate condition - 2% 
(Ref.: 20%) 
0.065
* 
(0.032) 
0.063
* 
(0.032) 
0.064
* 
(0.032) 
0.065
* 
(0.032) 
Gender - Male 0.062 0.053
*
 0.047 0.048 
 
(0.033) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level of education 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
Income ladder 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
Country of residence - 
UK*Inflation rate condition - 
2% 
-0.033 
(0.048) 
-0.031 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
Country of residence - 
UK*Gender -Male 
-0.033 
(0.050)    
Country of residence - 
UK*Age  
0.004
* 
(0.002)
 
  
Country of residence - UK* 
Level of education   
-0.004 
(0.019)  
Country of residence - 
UK*Income ladder    
0.002 
(0.017) 
Constant 0.456
***
 0.545
***
 0.452
***
 0.465
***
 
 
(0.070) (0.081) (0.076) (0.087) 
Observations 393 393 393 393 
R
2
 0.059 0.069 0.058 0.058 
Adjusted R
2
 0.040 0.049 0.039 0.039 
Residual Std. Error (df = 
384) 
0.235 0.234 0.235 0.235 
F Statistic (df = 8; 384) 3.028
**
 3.536
***
 2.977
**
 2.971
**
 
Note: 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
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Table S4.2: Main analysis with interactions between inflation rate condition and participant 
characteristics. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Area Under the Curve 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country of residence – UK  
(Ref.: Argentina) 
0.107
** 
(0.036) 
0.102
** 
(0.035) 
0.110
** 
(0.036) 
0.108
** 
(0.036) 
Inflation rate condition - 2% 
(Ref.: 20%) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
-0.131 
(0.090) 
0.075 
(0.071) 
-0.003 
(0.098) 
Gender-Male 0.020 0.042 0.048 0.047 
 
(0.037) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Level of education 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) 
Income ladder 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) 
Country of residence - UK*Inflation rate 
condition - 2% 
-0.033 
(0.048) 
-0.019 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
-0.030 
(0.049) 
Inflation rate condition - 2%*Gender -
Male 
0.051 
(0.050)    
Inflation rate condition - 2%*Age 
 
0.004
* 
(0.002)   
Inflation rate condition - 2%* Level of 
education   
-0.003 
(0.019)  
Inflation rate condition - 2%*Income 
ladder    
0.012 
(0.017) 
Constant 0.476
***
 0.574
***
 0.455
***
 0.498
***
 
 
(0.071) (0.085) (0.075) (0.087) 
Observations 393 393 393 393 
R
2
 0.061 0.071 0.058 0.060 
Adjusted R
2
 0.041 0.052 0.039 0.040 
Residual Std. Error (df = 384) 0.235 0.233 0.235 0.235 
F Statistic (df = 8; 384) 3.110
**
 3.688
***
 2.973
**
 3.042
**
 
Note: 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
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S5. Participants’ experience with inflation and treatment effects 
Table S5: Main analysis with interactions between inflation rate condition and participants’ 
experience with inflation (based on their age during periods of high inflation in each 
country). 
 
Dependent variable: Area Under the Curve 
 
UK Argentina 
Inflation rate condition - 2% 
(Ref.: 20%) 
0.016 
(0.037) 
0.017 
(0.052) 
Gender-Male 0.025 0.081
*
 
 
(0.036) (0.035) 
Experience with high inflation - UK 
0.020 
(0.068)  
Experience with high inflation - Argentina 
 
-0.083 
  
(0.052) 
Level of education 0.001 0.007 
 
(0.013) (0.015) 
Income ladder 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.013) 
Inflation rate condition - 2%* 
Experience with high inflation - UK 
0.115 
(0.098)  
Inflation rate condition - 2%* 
Experience with high inflation - Argentina  
0.076 
(0.068) 
Constant 0.632
***
 0.560
***
 
 
(0.069) (0.088) 
Observations 174 219 
R
2
 0.033 0.049 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.002 0.022 
Residual Std. Error 0.223 (df = 167) 0.243 (df = 212) 
F Statistic 0.957 (df = 6; 167) 1.811 (df = 6; 212) 
Note: 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
 
 
